Ideality and Cognitive Development: Further Comments on Azeri’s “The Match of Ideals” by Drain, Chris
 
http://social-epistemology.com 
ISSN: 2471-9560  
 
Ideality and Cognitive Development: Further Comments on Azeri’s “The Match of Ideals” 
 
Chris Drain, Villanova University, drain.chris@gmail.com 
 
–––––––––––––––––– 
 
Drain, Chris. 2020. “Ideality and Cognitive Development: Further Comments on Azeri’s 
‘The Match of Ideals’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (11): 15-27.  
 
 
 15 
9 (11): 15-27. 2020. 
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5vj 
In his recent article, Siyaves Azeri (2020) responds to “Wigner’s riddle,” i.e., how it is that 
mathematics can be so “unreasonably” effective at explaining physical law, especially 
considering how so many advanced mathematical concepts—unlike those of elementary 
arithmetic and geometry—originate so far removed from the world of practical concern. 
Wigner’s answer, we learn, is in effect a non-answer: “the appropriateness of the language of 
mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither 
understand nor deserve,” and amounts to nothing short of a “miracle” (Wigner 1960, 12).  
 
Azeri rightly rejects such an outlook, which he claims is founded on “the contemplative 
stance”—the mistaken though historically entrenched idea that human cognition is isolated 
in the individual, consists in processes internal to the individual, and must somehow 
adequate to the external world—and demonstrates how so many responses to “Wigner’s 
riddle” (e.g., Hamming 1980, Wilson 2000, Colyvan 2001, Islami 2017) do no better than 
recapitulate internalistic and individualistic biases associated with a naïve materialism.  
 
Even the recent work of Islami and Wiltsche fares no better for Azeri as it purports physics 
to be “a mathematized science in the sense that, at its core, it deals with idealized, exact 
objects—objects that are nowhere to be found in our ordinary experience of the world” 
(Azeri 2020, 8). Such a conception of ideality, Azeri claims, only reifies cognition as 
occurring in some “distinct and discrete realm ... in contradistinction to the practical and 
empirical realm” (6). Azeri explains that rather than being understood as some mental entity 
opposing the physical world, the ideal should instead be thought of as an orienting property 
of the social-objective world as interpreted and acted upon through one’s thoughts and 
actions: 
 
The concept, or the ideal, constitutes norms of human activity in the form of 
schemata of action, which are to be internalized so that individual 
consciousness takes shape. The gradual appearance of concepts is observable 
in the process of ontogenesis of consciousness. A brief look at the history of 
sciences reveals that concepts are also subject to a similar phylogenetic 
[emphasis added] developmental process, i.e. they form and emerge, change, 
even sometimes die out against a socio-historical background. Mathematical 
concepts, contrary to the widespread belief in their trans-historicity, are no 
exception; they develop historically and are closely interconnected with the 
mode and the consequent schemata of human activity (12). 
 
First and foremost, I think Azeri presents a stimulating and much needed Marxist critique of 
the supposed ideality of mathematics and its “miraculous” correspondence to physics. In his 
discussion, Azeri focuses mainly on the work of Ilyenkov, who saw his project as a 
continuation of Soviet Marxism inaugurated in the cultural historical psychology of L.S. 
Vygotsky and formalized in the activity theory of A.N. Leontiev. I see nothing wrong with 
this. Azeri’s paper, I believe, is a successful one. I would like to take the opportunity, 
however, to expand the scope of Azeri’s discussion by attending to the phylogenetic dimension 
of the development of conceptual cognition in general.  
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Azeri quite well shows that arithmetical thinking emerges on the basis of specific social 
practices and material engagement (clay tokens for economic exchange practices beget 
number concepts, e.g.). He also notes the normative basis of such thinking when he writes: 
  
The invention-exploration of new areas of activity, that is, the expansion of 
the range of social (humanized) reality and the ‘thinkable’, bring about new 
norms and schemata that do not simply reside on the top of the formerly 
produced and accumulated schemata but rather subject them to qualitative 
changes, turning them into moments of these newly constituted norms (13). 
 
But his discussion here is relegated mostly to Neolithic and Bronze Age practices. While 
surely such practices produced revolutions in the cognitive abilities of many humans, much 
of the cognitive architecture that allows normative conceptual thought was already in place 
long before this time. This response, then, is an attempt to sketch the deep prehistory of 
human cognition in order to show the inter-social bases of normative thought in general.  
   
To do this, I will look first to the work of Vygotsky and Leontiev, two often neglected 
psychologists whose combined efforts culminate in a developmental account of human 
cognitive origins. Then, I will review some key insights from the contemporary comparative 
psychologist Michael Tomasello—whose project is admittedly a Vygotskian one—in order 
to further shed light on the social-practical basis of abstract thought, of which mathematical 
cognition is surely a part.     
 
Vygotsky: Culture, Mediation, Internalization 
 
Soviet developmental psychologist L.S. Vygotsky (1896-1934) is known for offering a 
dialectical and non-reductionistic account of human development as grounded in “material 
collaborative social practices” (Stetsenko and Arievitch 2010, 231). Writing in the years 
following the October Revolution, Vygotsky was critical, inter alia, of the outdated 
metaphysical presuppositions of early 20th century psychology. His most basic 
methodological concern was to formulate a “general psychology” that could move beyond 
the stale impasse between “Objective” and “Subjective” programs in psychology. In many 
ways, such an impasse was a holdover from early modern debates between monistic 
materialism and substance dualism.  
 
Fast-forward to the early 20th century and you had either “Subjectivist” theories of psycho-
physical parallelism attempting to bridge the mind-body divide, or like the “Objectivist” you 
could reject the mental all together in the name of reflex. For Vygotsky, neither route would 
do. Such a divide must be bridged along a third “way”—by studying the relation of the 
individual to her social environment.  
 
For Vygotsky, the socio-material world is an integral component in the cognitive 
development of a given individual. To study cognition is thus to study its development. And 
this necessitates taking into consideration an individual’s cultural-historical context. Vygotsky 
accomplishes this by recourse to a multi-scalar “genetic” methodology which takes as its 
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object the ontogenesis, phylogenesis, and historical emergence of particularly human 
cognitive capacities.  
 
However, a disambiguation must be made regarding the relationship between phylogenetic 
and historical development. While a “Vygotskian” program avails itself of any “deep” 
evolutionary data to explain mental functioning, with respect to the question of human 
cognitive origins phylogeny must be considered to be culturally and artifactually determined: 
human history begins with technical-semiotic development and the concurrent development 
of cultural forms of life. In other words, we could say that for Vygotsky not only is the 
general biological development of the species taken as explanatorily relevant with respect to 
cognition, but more importantly is the species’ development as it leaves the bounds of purely 
biological determination.  
 
As Vygotsky explains, the “historical development of man differs from the adaptation and 
development of animals because the process of mental development in man is part of the 
total historical development of mankind” (Vygotsky 1997b, 39). Such a general level of 
explanation in part informs further developmental levels: the ontogenetic level (the 
individual history of a subject), and the specific history of the development of higher mental 
functions (which draws from general cultural histories to explain the development of 
particular psychological systems). For our purposes, the phylogenetic level must somewhat 
be collapsed with the cultural-historical. This is important for our reading of Tomasello, 
which we will see provides a cultural/phylogenetic explanation of the emergence of the kind 
of abstract cognition necessary for the creation of mathematical concepts.    
 
According to Vygotsky, psychological development is the result of “internalization,” or the 
functional reorganization of cognitive capacities based on socio-material mediation. This is 
the defining feature of Vygotsky’s application of Marxian materialism to psychology: that the 
human mind is a historical rather than biological product, one based ultimately on the labor 
activity of humans in social groups. Distinctly human “higher mental functions” (e.g., 
semantic memory, propositional cognition, numeracy, and literacy) arise during the 
organism’s transition away from the biologically primary behavior of environmental and 
ecological affordance-based reactions to the culturally and technically mediated activity of 
the self-conscious agent. Such an agent is a self-regulating entity which has mastered its 
“reactive functions” and as such can enter into new and varied goal-directed relations with 
its environment based on meaningful (semiotic), rather than simply functional, constraints:  
 
In subjecting to his will the process of his own reactions, man enters in this 
way into a substantially new relation with the environment, comes to a new 
functional exploitation of elements in the environment as stimulus-signs 
which he uses... and directs and controls his own behavior... and elicits 
reactions that he desires (Vygotsky 1999, 63).    
 
The mediation of activity through technical and semiotic devices or signs—i.e., psychological 
tools or “cognitive artifacts” (Norman 1991)—is thus the main effector of the structural and 
functional transformation of cognitive capacities. It is precisely these devices as socio-
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cultural “repositories” which effect, through socialized interaction with them, the genesis 
and structuration of higher cognitive abilities. Thus, when considered on an evolutionary 
timeline, the utilization of technical and psychological devices constitutes the cultural 
mechanism of hominization, accounting for the phylogenetic development of Homo sapiens as 
a historical species. When considered on an ontogenetic time-line, such psychological tools 
account for the emergence of higher mental functions insofar as they constitute the 
mechanisms accounting for the emergence of an individual agent via the internalization of 
once exterior social activity. 
 
Mathematical cognition by Vygotsky’s score is a “higher mental function.” What we have 
seen thus far is that the emergence of such functions is predicated on cultural development. 
In this next section we’ll look more closely at the work of Vygotsky’s disciple, A.N. 
Leontiev, who emphasizes the normative dimension of cognition and its origin in joint 
activity. As Azeri correctly demonstrates, the ideal objects of mathematics are necessarily 
derived from human activity. With Leontiev, will we touch further on the phylogenetic 
emergence of such “ideal cognition.”   
 
Leontiev: Activity, Ideality, and Phylogenesis   
 
A.N. Leontiev (1903-1979) is known as the formalizer of ‘activity theory,’ a research 
program in psychology that seeks to explain the origins of human consciousness in terms of 
the practical activity of the socialized individual.1 Following Marx and Vygotsky, Leontiev 
understands “object-oriented activity” as a central, unifying, category that explains the 
production of the social world and its “reflection” in human consciousness. That is, through 
activity, the human both objectifies the natural world in production, and in doing so, 
psychologically appropriates the various and interconnected social and objective relations laid 
forth in objectification. While Vygotsky stresses the importance of mediation in the genesis 
of higher mental functions, by Leontiev’s reading, his account comes up short in recognizing 
the contributions of the broader social world in the process of psychogenesis. Thus, 
Leontiev expands Vygotsky’s account to include the normative and collective goals of social 
systems at large. 
 
According to Leontiev, insofar as the world of the developing individual is a product of 
cultural, historical, and material activity, that world is thus an ideal world. But Leontiev 
understands ideality in contradistinction to the traditional Western canon, where “ideal” 
connotes “mental” as opposed to “physical.” Rather, for Leontiev the ideal is part and parcel 
to the subject’s activity in the world. Taking Vygotsky’s insight that the origin of higher 
                                               
1 I would say ‘founder’ of the program if Vygotsky’s role as its antecedent was not so large. Most activity 
theorists, Leontiev included, take Vygotsky’s genetic methodology and his principle of the transformative 
power of cultural mediation as foundational to the discipline (Maidansky and Oittinen 2017). Regarding the 
concept of activity in general—though seen by many as its most influential theorist, the conception of activity 
as Lebenstätigkeit was not unique to Leontiev. It was common to many Soviet theorists who wished to 
contribute to a Marxian account of human consciousness and social life. Lektorsky, Ilyenkov, and Yudin are 
just some of the figures that took up the notion, and the Soviet intellectual scene of the 1960s and 70s was rife 
with competing philosophical-psychological theories of activity.    
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mental functions is to be found in the “equipped (‘instrumented’) structure of human activity 
and its incorporation into the system of interrelationships with other people,” Leontiev 
argues that such mental functions “assume a structure that has as its obligatory link socially-
historically formed means and methods” (Leontiev 2009a, 94-95).  
 
Leontiev further argues that in such processes of interiorization, “simultaneously there takes 
place a change in the very form of the psychological reflection of reality: Consciousness 
appears as a reflection by the subject of reality, his own activity, and himself” (95). Human 
consciousness is thus unique insofar as its content is ideal, relating to the broader social 
world. Yet such content remains vitally linked to a material basis insofar as its continued 
ontological maintenance depends on the social-practical engagement of the subject in her 
world. When taken in its specifically (human) psychological sense, activity thus refers not 
simply to “brain-processes,” but to social activity as refracted through the individual, both 
internally and externally. 
 
For Leontiev, mental reflection and representations are dialectical phenomena, maintaining 
an existence “inseparable from the subject’s activity” (Leontiev 2009a, 76). Such phenomena 
are by no means “copies” of the objective world but rather exist as neuronal configurations 
that source potentials of orientation in the world; that is, the subjective image is objectively 
realized “as it becomes apparent to the person in one system or another of objective 
connections” (loc. cit.). However, Leontiev argues that the particularly human form of such 
reflective processes deals with the objective world as a social world, one that is itself the 
product of historical and cultural development.  
 
The content of the reflected image, then, for the human is something meaningful in a 
manner not available to other forms of animal life: “Sensory images represent a universal 
form of psychic reflection having its origin in the objective activity of the subject” (Leontiev 
2009a, 125). Thus, human cognition is differentiated from the non-human with respect to 
the its social-semiotic content: “In man, however, sensory images assume a new quality, 
specifically, their signification. Meanings are the most important ‘formers’ of human 
consciousness” (loc. cit.). For Leontiev, then, whatever “meaningful” activity the non-human 
animal partakes in is still grounded on biological impulse. Only the human can entertain 
socially reflected i.e., idealized, meanings.2   
 
Still, it’s important to remember that for Leontiev such idealizations must not be thought of 
as “emanations” of Geist. Not even logical and mathematical concepts (and by extension, the 
concepts of modern physics), despite the fact that they are still often “presented as some sort 
                                               
2 Leontiev (like Vygotsky before him) is rather traditional on this front, maintaining a clear nature/culture 
dichotomy in which non-natural meaning is available only to cultural animals (humans). But see Jablonka and 
Lamb (2005, 160) and Tomasello (2014, 82) for the view that culture (and thinking) abounds in the animal 
kingdom. Still, at least for Tomasello, non-human animal culture including that of animals evolutionarily closest 
to us (i.e., non-human primates) is essentially individualistic and exploitative. In contrast, the transmission and 
creation of human-specific culture is founded on the cooperative and recursive sociality endemic to the 
foraging niches of late Pliocene and early Pleistocene hominins, a sociality that serves as the basis for all further 
human cultural development. 
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of divine inspiration with no relation to social reality” (Azeri 2020, 5). Leontiev (2009a) 
argues instead that:    
 
In contrast to the views of the laws of logic as if they arise from the 
principles of the working of the mind (or as if they express immanent laws of 
a thinking spirit, or finally as if they are evoked by the development of the 
language of science itself), the Marxist view considers logical laws as 
representing a generalized reflection of those objective relations of activity 
that practical human activity produces and to which it is subject. “The 
practical activity of man,” notes V. I. Lenin, “must have brought the 
consciousness of man a million times to the repetition of various logical 
figures in order that these figures might acquire the significance of axioms.” 
Thus, practical activity, practice, is like a guiding thread for theoretical 
thought that prevents theoretical thought from losing the way leading to 
adequate knowledge (55-56). 
 
So practical activity breeds abstract cognition. That’s all well and good, but we are still after 
an explanation of how the capacity to entertain ideal content phylogenetically emerges. Leontiev 
fortunately does give us some details here. And while a full reckoning of Leontiev’s account 
is beyond the scope of this response (though see Drain 2018), we can note that Leontiev, 
like Vygotsky before him, accepts and refines Engels’ account of the role of labor in the 
phylogenetic development of human cognition (Engels 1946). Yet Leontiev goes beyond 
Engels in claiming that early humans only became humans at all by means of joint activity. 
Thus, non-human animals may engage in activity that is no more than an aggregate of 
individual activities, while humans enjoy a qualitatively different type of joint activity—they 
can do things together.  
 
Leontiev’s account is close in spirit to Michael Tomasello’s (2014) recent work which traces 
the development of human cognition and communication along shifts in the social role of 
intentionality in early humans. Unfortunately, Leontiev does not explain exactly what is 
entailed by joint activity beyond mentioning that it is a uniquely human phenomenon: “we 
can observe the activity of a few, sometimes of many, animals together, but we never 
observe joint activity among them, i.e. in the sense of the word as we employ it when 
speaking of men’s activity” (2009b, 176). This is not particularly helpful—one would at least 
hope to hear what cognitive capacities and mechanisms are entailed by such joint activity but 
Leontiev is mute here. At least partially to blame is Leontiev’s avoidance of the concept of 
intentionality. Leontiev follows Vygotsky on this point and, though the reasons may be 
speculative, a case can be made that the vocabulary of “intentionality” is simply the currency 
of phenomenologists, especially Husserl, and should on those grounds alone be avoided. For 
Vygotsky, Husserl was one among a group of “extreme idealists, who reject the possibility of 
psychology as a natural science” (1997a, 294). As we saw with Azeri’s reading of Islami and 
Wiltsch, there may be good reason to avoid a phenomenology that reifies the ideal as 
something removed from socially embedded activity. But that doesn’t mean we must avoid 
intentionality altogether. As Tomasello shows, it is a cognitive feature that plays an essential 
role in the emergence of abstract thought.   
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Tomasello: Individual Intentionality, Protological Inferences, and Joint 
Intentionality 
 
Michael Tomasello is a leading promulgator of the idea that social and cultural cooperation 
are primarily responsible for the evolutionary development of higher mental functions in 
humans. Tomasello analyzes the emergence of human cognition in a series of three phases, 
corresponding to creatures who are (1) individually intentional (the great apes), (2) jointly 
intentional varieties of pre-sapiens hominins, (Homo erectus and Homo heidlebergensis, e.g.), and 
(3) collectively intentional Homo sapiens. Central to Tomasello’s account, then, is the idea that 
the main drivers of human cognitive differentiation rest uniquely on collaborative activity 
and shared intentionality.  
 
As Tomasello argues, great apes and presumably a variety of pre-sapiens hominins had a 
range of cognitive skills that centered on the needs of the individual. Such beings indeed are 
“thinking beings” and entertain a variety of intentional states. Yet such primate intentionality 
is individually driven. Great apes and early hominins thus entertain representations—though 
not the socially contentful representations of the sort exemplified by Leontiev’s “ideal 
reflection.” Rather, they represent relevant situations imagistically and schematically. A 
situation is relevant insofar as it affords either an opportunity or obstacle for personal gain 
(Tomasello 2014, 11). But how the organism decides to act in such a situation is not simply 
instinctually determined—at least for “higher” animals. Many organisms, primates included, 
go cognitively “beyond” the situation at hand in order to make creative inferences about 
what to do next.  
 
Azeri mentions a remark by R.W. Hamming concerning the origin of mathematical 
reasoning in prehistorical humans (Azeri 2020, 4). To quote Hamming (1980) in full:  
 
It seems … that in the very foundations of primitive life there was built in, 
for survival purposes if for nothing else, an understanding of cause and 
effect. Once this trait is built up beyond a single observation to a sequence of 
‘If this, then that, and then it follows further still that...,’ we are on the path 
of the first features of mathematics ... (83).  
 
This comment proves a useful cipher in explaining the phylogenetic origin of abstract 
cognition in a Vygotskian vein. For as Tomasello shows, protological reasoning is a skill 
already available to pre-human anthropoids. That is, many great apes are adept at causal reasoning 
and can cognize about the social and physical world using “protological” inferences—a 
primitive sort of modus ponens and tollens (Tomasello 2014, 17-24). They can also engage in 
types of behavioral and cognitive self-monitoring in which they “seem to be monitoring not 
just imagined actions and their imagined results, or imagined causes and their imagined 
outcomes, but also their own knowledge or memory—which they then use to make 
inferences about their likelihood of behavioral success” (25). The point for us, however, is 
that such hypothetical reasoning can’t be the proximate basis for the development of 
mathematical thought, because it’s plenty common in animals who don’t have mathematical 
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concepts. Something else needs to be added. And not just the element of social cognition, 
but social cognition as manifest in cooperative rather than individualistic creatures.   
 
By Tomasello’s account, organisms with individual intentionality are open to both causal and 
intentional inferences based on their previous perceptual experiences, and a situation may be 
relevant in terms of social and/or physical perceptual cues. For example, an ape may infer 
that a stick (that she wants to use) is being weighed down by a rock based on previous, now 
schematized, dealings with rocks. And after inferring or simulating a plan of action to 
remove the rock, she may dislodge the stick. Likewise, the ape may infer that a conspecific is 
“climbing a tree as an intentional event of a particular type, and then infer something about 
goals and attention as intentional causes as so predict the climber’s impending actions” 
(Tomasello 2014, 13). The point is, such organisms schematize based on previous perceptual 
experiences in order to represent and simulate possible patterns of action. And as Tomasello 
notes, such simulations have a logical structure based on causal inferences. When dealing 
purely with the physical world, causal “if, then” reasoning drives the intentional action of the 
agent. In a relevant social situation, such causal reasoning is compounded with intentional 
reasoning. As Tomasello makes clear, great apes think about the social world. However, such 
cognition is based on competition (for food, sexual partners, and other resources) rather 
than cooperation.  
 
Invoking Bakhurst’s (2017) reading of Ilyenkov, Azeri (2020) remarks that: 
 
The ideal is normative in character; it determines human thinking and actions 
rationally more than causally. Human activity is essentially guided by reason 
rather than being merely determined by causes. The ideal is independent of 
the will and thinking of the thinking subject; in this sense, it has an objective 
existence … (11). 
 
I think it’s not much of a stretch to situate Tomasello’s account of individual intentionality 
as occurring at a non-ideal, subjective/causal level. Whence comes the ideal, then, and its 
concomitant objectivity and rationality? For Tomasello the answer lies in the transition from 
individual to joint intentionality, where for the first time there emerges a cognitive-
communicative shift towards cooperation.  
 
Under the joint intentional model, two conspecifics knowingly collaborate in their pursuit of 
common goal. This requires a shared sense of commitment and necessitates a goal-specific 
division of labor. That is, for each collaborative activity, each individual has a specific role. 
According to Tomasello (2014), “this dual-level structure of simultaneous sharedness and 
individuality—a joint goal but with individual roles—is a uniquely human form of second-
person joint engagement requiring species-unique cognitive skills and motivational 
propensities” (43).  
 
In terms of the representational capacities of early hominids, the joint intentional framework 
moves beyond the individualistic rendering of situationally relevant content in at least two 
key ways. 
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First, the ability to engage in joint intentional activity is predicated on a capacity for joint 
attention, and such joint attention radically restructures the representational capacity of the 
“individually intentional” creature. As opposed to merely utilizing imagistic schemata based 
on its personal history and present individual goal state, the hominid engaging in joint 
intentional relations has a perspectival relation to reality. Crucially, “the notion of perspective assumes 
a single target of joint attention on which we have differing perspectives” (44). And just as joint 
intentional activity creates a dual-level structure of common goal/individual role, joint 
attentional activities create a dual-level structure of joint attention and individual perspective. 
The representational efforts of early hominids thus involve schematizing “a cognitive model 
of the dual-level collaborative structure comprising a joint goal with individual roles and 
joint attention with individual perspectives” (69).  
 
Second, perspectival representational capacity expands the conceptual capacity of the 
previously “individual-intentional” cognizer. The proto-concepts available to great apes, for 
instance, are always tied to the organism’s individual goal state. A tree, as Tomasello points 
out, could be representationally construed and categorically registered as an escape route or a 
sleeping place, but never both at once. Unlike human concepts, which can be overlaid upon 
the same referent and entertained simultaneously, the ape can only conceptualize an entity 
based on its particular need or want in a given moment. According to Tomasello, the ability 
to conceptualize a thing under different aspects comes about as a result of early hominid 
perspectival cognition. And such was essential for communicative action in collaborative 
activity: 
 
Indeed, each time [early hominids] communicated, they had to make their 
communicative act relevant and new for the recipient in the context of her 
goals and values, their common ground, and her existing knowledge and 
expectations. As they were thus thinking how their communicative act might 
fit into the life of the recipient, communicators had to consider several 
alternative perspectives simultaneously, and only then choose a 
communicative act to instantiate one of them (loc. cit.). 
 
As Tomasello goes on to underscore, such representational cognition necessarily has to take 
into account “the conative and epistemic states” of the other (70). In other words, for the 
first time in evolutionary history, the same situation is cognized with respect to multiple 
perspectives, thus inaugurating a subject/object divide. 
 
Recall Azeri describes the ideal as having “an objective existence.” The perspectival 
cognition afforded by joint intentional activity constitutes a giant leap from the subjective 
and causal cognition of individual intentionality. But have we arrived at the truly objective 
cognition of “ideal reflection”? To put it another way, while the ape can subjectively 
entertain and execute protological “if-then” inferences, it certainly falls short of entertaining 
the “ideal” thought that “2+2=4.” Can such a thought exist for the joint intentional pre-
sapiens hominin? Not yet, by Tomasello’s account. For that we need collective intentionality.  
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Collective Intentionality and Ideality  
 
Tomasello’s joint intentional model provides the necessary pivot away from a primary 
developmental stage where cognitive capacities are grounded on individual intentionality, to 
a more complex stage where such representational, communicative, and self-monitoring 
capacities are restructured and repurposed according to a dyadic interactional framework. It 
is here that members of the genus Homo are first to develop anything close to the abstract 
conceptual thought and normative cultural roles that come to typify human-specific forms of 
life. But such a dawning of species-specific cognition consists mostly in ephemeral instances, 
being tied directly to the joint activity at hand.  
 
With joint intentionality, cognition has become perspectivalized but not yet collectivized, 
which for Tomasello is the marker of uniquely human culture. Joint intentionality is thus a 
transitional stage that cognitively and socially scaffolds the emergence of collective 
intentionality. Where in the joint intentional model an individual coordinates her activity 
with a specific concrete individual, under the model of collective intentionality an individual 
coordinates her activity in accordance abstractly, with any individual—“some kind of generic 
other” (Tomasello 2014, 81).  
 
This is not the place to engage in a full recounting of Tomasello exposition of the 
development of collective intentionality (which includes detailed discussions of the features 
of group identification and institutional reality, communicative conventions and resultant 
conceptualizations, linguistic productivity, and reflective self-monitoring). However, I do 
want to dwell briefly on Tomasello’s account of the origin of reason, which as with 
Ilyenkov’s “ideal,” is normative in character.  
 
Tomasello notes that while a joint intentional hominin could attempt to convince a 
collaborative partner of some course of action by, e.g., gesturing to some tracks on the 
ground that are relevant to the context of the transpiring hunting activity and then pointing 
to indicate some trajectory that we should follow, such communicative activity nonetheless 
falls short of constituting “fully reasoned thinking” (109). With fully conventional 
communication, however, “we get to full-blooded reasoning, where ‘reasoning’ means not 
just to think about something but to explicate in conventional form—for others or 
oneself—the reasons why one is thinking what one is thinking” (110).  
 
In this sense, Tomasello follows Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber in pinpointing the 
emergence of reasoning within the context of the evolution of human communication and 
identifying its function as argumentative. According to Mercier and Sperber, signals that 
reliably demonstrate their own truth abound in the animal kingdom (e.g. antlers and their 
defensive applicability); however, there are few overt guarantors of the reliability of the “rich 
and varied informational contents” for creatures engaging in conventional communication 
(2011, 60). Thus, when there is insufficient trust on the part of the recipient, the 
communicator uses reasons to elicit assent to the veracity of her statement. Tomasello follows 
all this, but highlights that such exchanges manifest within a cooperative context of shared 
decision making.  
 
 
 25 
9 (11): 15-27. 2020. 
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-5vj 
According to Tomasello, “cooperative argumentation in the context of joint or collective 
decision making is thus premised on a shared metric that we both use in determining which 
reasons are indeed ‘best’” (Tomasello 2014, 111). Hence, argumentative norms arise and are 
eventually standardized and even formalized (as early Greek theorists made explicit in the 
law of noncontradiction and the law of identity). It is also in the argumentative context 
where once merely informational speech acts become fully assertive speech acts, which 
commit the speaker not only to honesty but to the objective truth of the statement. As such, 
reasons are provided to make publicly explicit “the bases on which I believe something, 
which because [others] share these bases, might give them reason to believe it as well” (112). 
Thus, if it is common knowledge that we avoid certain places with predators, and I have 
spotted predators at place X today, I have good reason to call into question the plan of 
foraging at X later in the afternoon. And if someone questions my disapproval of the plan, I 
only need to make explicit, i.e., assert, that there are predators at X; if challenged I can 
provide further justifications, but they would not pertain to the common background 
knowledge that predators are dangerous but rather, e.g., whether I was sure I saw them.  
 
The mechanics of rational argumentation point to the what Davidson (1982) and Searle 
(1983) describe as the “intrinsically holistic character” of propositional attitudes and 
intentional states. As Tomasello (2014) explains: 
  
This ability to connect thoughts to other thoughts (both those of others and 
one’s own) by various inferential relations (prototypically by providing 
reasons and justifications) is key to human reason in general, and it leads to a 
kind of interconnection among all of an individual’s potential thoughts in a 
kind of holistic ‘web of beliefs’ (112).  
 
The Vygotskian uptake of all of this, according to Tomasello (2014), is that it is through 
internalizing such interpersonal processes of explication and argumentation that an 
individual can become a rational agent: 
 
Making things explicit to facilitate the comprehension of a recipient leads the 
communicator to simulate, before actually producing an utterance, how his 
planned communicative act might be comprehended—perhaps in a kind of 
inner dialogue. Making things explicit to persuade someone in an argument 
leads the disputant to simulate ahead of time how a potential opponent 
might counter his argument, and so to make ready, in thought, an 
interconnected set of reasons and justifications—again, perhaps, in a kind of 
inner dialogue.... Human reasoning, even when it is done internally with the 
self, is therefore shot through and through with a kind of collective 
normativity in which the individual regulates her actions and thinking based 
on the group’s normative conventions and standards (112-113).  
 
Tomasello invokes Robert Brandom’s (1994, 497) adage that (to paraphrase) “monological 
thinking is parasitic on dialogical thinking,” but the Vygotskian point remains—particularly 
human cognition is founded on interpersonal social processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
C. Drain 
 26 
What does this mean for mathematical cognition? Hopefully we’ve seen that mere 
hypothetical inferences do not provide the adequate foundation for the development of 
normative ideal cognition. Collective communicative conventions must be in place first in 
order that any metacognitive thought “X is correct” or “X is incorrect” can ever come about. A 
thought such “2+2=5 is incorrect” is thus only possible on the basis of collective 
intentionality.   
 
Final Remarks  
 
This has hopefully been an informative backstory to the emergence of the abstract 
normative cognition requisite for mathematical reasoning. Unfortunately, all this has not 
done much to answer Azeri’s concluding questions regarding the rise of mathematics’ 
“quantitative attitude toward reality” and how this might have accompanied the Modern 
shift toward Capitalist relations of production. One could hope that Vygotsky, Leontiev, and 
Tomasello might provide some of tools needed to answer this. Indeed, Azeri already has 
much of the theoretical footing in place for what must follow as an interdisciplinary 
investigation. I only hope to have contributed to that foundation.  
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